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THE EFFICACY OF GUARANTY CONTRACTS 
IN SOPHISTICATED COMMERCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS 
PETER A. A.LCEst 
Even though contracts of guaranty are not subject to unfform stan-
dards of interpretation throughout the states, both case law and statu-
tory development have tended to evidence a strong sympathy for the 
guarantor. In spite of this trend, Professor A/ces suggests that credi-
tors' counsel can, through careful drqfting, do much to assure the en-
forceability of the guaranty contract. A scrupulously structured 
guaranty contract, one that anticipates possible defenses to liability in 
explicit terms, may well be upheld, even in cases in which guarantors 
occupied weak negotiating positions vis-a-vis creditors. Moreover, the 
attack on the guaranty as a fraudulent conveyance under section 548 of 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 can also be succes.iful(v avoided 
In this instance, the creditor should be prepared to make the argument 
that solvency of the guarantor is to be assessed on the basis of a "going 
concern" value. Thus, careful anticipatory drqfting, and well-reasoned 
analysis of "value" in the case of a fraudulent conveyance attack, may 
assist the creditor who seeks to enforce a contract of guaranty. 
Contracts of guaranty arise in various contexts, take any one of several 
forms, and may be either secured by real or personal1 property or entirely 
unsecured.2 The law governing guaranties differs from state to state, and there 
t Assistant Professor of Business Law, Graduate School of Business, University of Texas at 
Austin; A.B. 1977, Lafayette College; J.D. 1980, University of Illinois. Member, State Bar of 
Illinois. The author will join the faculty of the University of Alabama School of Law in the Fall, 
1983. 
I. Potential collateral for a guaranty may be the stock of the corporation whose obligation 
the principal is asked to guaranty. In that case the creditor will require the guarantor to execute a 
"Pledge Agreement," describing the parties' rights to the pledged stock, as well as a form of stock 
power signed in blank in order to facilitate efficient disposition of the securities. Although the 
value of the stock in the closely held corporate debtor is liable to be negligible by the time the 
creditor would be interested in foreclosing on it, taking the stock in pledge alone with the attend-
ant voting rights is an effective way to preclude the guarantor's dealing with the stock in a manner 
inconsistent with the creditor's best interests. In such transactions, however, the creditor must be 
careful to avoid, to the extent practicable, allegations that the creditor is "in control" of the debtor. 
See II U.S.C. § 101(25)(B)(iii) (Supp. V 1981) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which 
defines "insider'' as "a person in control of the debtor corporation," and consider the ramifications 
of such a characterization in II U.S.C. § 547 (Supp. V 1981), dealing with "Preferences" under the 
Bankruptcy Code. Section 547(b)(4)(B)(i) extends the preference statute of limitations from 90 
days to one year if "the creditor . . . was an insider; and . . . had reasonable cause to believe the 
debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer." See also i'!fra note 131. 
2. The properties and characteristics of the so-called "guaranty" letter of credit are not con-
sidered in this article. See O'Grady v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 296 N.C. 212, 250 S.E.2d 587 
(1978); Verkuil, Bank Solvency and Guaranty Leiters of Credit, 25 STAN. L. REV. 716 (1973); Note, 
Guaranty Leiters of Credit: Problems and Possibilities, 16 ARIZ. L. REv. 822 (1974). 
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is neither applicable uniform legislation3 nor comprehensive federallegisla-
tion4 in the area. That dearth of statutory guidance has frustrated commercial 
expectations. Current economic conditions5 and recent developments in the 
law<> have called attention to the serious consequences that attend the inconsis-
tent treatment afforded contracts of guaranty in the courts. 
A guaranty may be absolute, conditional,? general, special,8 continuing,9 
3. Certain provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) deal specifically with the 
right of a guarantor, such as UCC § 3-606 (1978), which provides, in pertinent part: 
Impairment o/ Recourse or o/ Collateral 
(1) The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the extent that without such 
party's consent the holder 
(a) without express reservation of rights releases or agrees not to sue any person against 
whom the party has to the knowledge of the holder a right of recourse or agrees to 
suspend the right to enforce against such person the instrument or collateral or otherwise 
discharges such person, except that failure or delay in effecting any required present-
ment, protest or notice of dishonor with respect to any such person does not diScharge 
any party as to whom presentment, protest or notice of dishonor is ineffective or unnec-
essary; or 
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument given by or on behalf of the 
party or any party against whom he has a right of recourse. 
UCC § 3-606 (1978) is limited to guaranties of''negotiable" instruments; therefore, its application 
is severely limited because many of the promissory notes used in sophisticated commercial trans-
actions do not fit the UCC § 3-104 (1978) definition: 
(I) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article [3) must 
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and 
(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money and no 
other promise, order, obligation or power given by the maker or drawer except as au-
thorized by this Article; and 
(c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and 
(d) be payable to order or to bearer. 
See also il!fra text accompanying notes 96-111. See generally Brennan & Burdick, JJoes the Guar-
antor Guarantee? Lender, Beware!, II SETON HALL L. REV. 353 (1981); Hawkland, The Liability 
o/ Accommodation Parties Under Article 3 '![the Un!form Commercial Code, 25 PRAc. LAW. 35 
(1979). 
. 4. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy Code}, 11 U.S.C. §§ 509 ("Claim of 
codebtor"), 1301 ("Stay of action against codebtor") (Supp. V 1981) will have limited rather than 
pervasive impact on contracts of guaranty. 
5. See_ e.g., Petzinger, Taking Shelter: AM International Gets a Vital Second Chance by 
Using Chapter 11, Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 1982, at 1, col. 6 (describing the plight of a large national 
corporation and suggesting that the recession of the early part of this decade will subject many 
business relations to scrutiny in bankruptcy courts). 
6. See i'!(ra text accompanying notes 134-75. 
7. The "absolute" guaranty and "conditional" guaranty are procedural opposites of one 
another. Before a conditional guaranty may be enforced, certain prescribed conditions must be 
satisfied. A creditor may enforce an absolute guaranty notwithstanding the occurrence or nonoc-
currence of any event either within or not within the contemplation of the parties at the time the 
guaranty was executed. A guaranty is deemed absolute unless its terms import some condition to 
the guarantor's liability. See Glickman v. Collins, 13 Cal. 3d 852, 533 P.2d 204, 120 Cal. Rptr. 76 
(1975); Moffett v. Miller, 119 Cal. 2d 712, 260 P.2d 215 (1953); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. 
Ass'n v. McRae, 81 Cal. App. 2d 1, 183 P.2d 385 (1947); Chios v. Marlow, 39 Colo. App. 218, -, 
563 P.2d 387, 389 (1977); Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Manolakis, 613 P.2d 438 (Okla. 1980); Rucker v. 
Republic Supply Co., 415 P.2d 951 (Okla. 1966). See also Bank of Kirkwood Plaza v. Mueller, 
294 N.W.2d 640, 644 (N.D. 1980); State Bank v. Porter, 167 N.W.2d 527 (N.D. 1969); National 
Bank v. Equity Inv., 81 Wash. 2d 886, 506 P.2d 39 (1973); Robey v. Walton Lumber Co., 17 Wash. 
2d 242, 135 P.2d 95 (1943). 
8. A "general" guaranty is made to no particular creditor, while a "special " guaranty vests 
rights in the requesting creditor. See Joe Balestrieri & Co. v. Comm'r, 177 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 
1949); Austin v. New Brunswick Fire Ins. Co., 111 Mont. 192, 108 P.2d 1036 (1941). 
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unlimited, 10 a guaranty of payment, or of collection or collectability.•• Rather 
than treat all the permutations of the foregoing types of guaranties, this article 
focuses on the absolute, continuing, unlimited guaranty of payment made by 
corporations, partnerships, and individuals. The article summarizes the signif-
icant considerations that bear upon the use of guaranties by discussing perti-
nent cases and legislative developments. The approach necessarily precludes 
in-depth discussion of nonuniversal state law doctrines, but will include an 
analysis of the relevant aspects of contract12 law, as well as the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy Code) and those procedures by which lend-
ers try to assure the enforceability of guaranties.13 Throughout the course of 
the article, reference will be made to certain standard guaranty provisions. 
The design is not to provide the foundation for a "canned form," but rather to 
complement the substantive material with practical suggestions. 
I. APPLICABLE CONTRACT LAW 
The law governing contracts of guaranty is normally the geio.eral common 
9. A "continuing" guaranty is not limited to an isolated transaction but contemplates a se-
ries of transactions, often for an indefinite period oftime. See Standard Oil v. Houser, 101 Cal. 
App. 2d 480, 225 P.2d 539 (1950); Valley Nat'l Bank v. Foreign Car Rental, Inc., 157 Colo. 545, 
404 P.2d 272 (1965); Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Warner, 35 Colo. App. 434, 535 P.2d 1132 
(1975); Ransom Distrib. Co. v. Lazy B Ltd., 35 Colo. App. 86, 532 P.2d 366 (1974); Bonura v. 
Christian Bros. Poultry Co., 336 So. 2d 881 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Har-
ley, 13 So. 2d 84 (La. Ct. App. 1943); Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Manolakis, 61J P.2d 438 (Okla. 
1980); Rucker v. Republic Supply Co., 415 P.2d 951 (Okla. 1966); Houston Furniture Distrib., Inc. 
v. Bank of Woodlake, 562 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Reece v. First State Bank, 555 
S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Blount v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 432 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1968). 
10. It is safer practice to avoid taking a limited guaranty because courts may be quite willing 
to accept the arguments of a limited guarantor that follow this type of reasoning: when a guaranty 
provides that the guarantor is to be liable for $300 of a $1000 indebtedness and only $500 of that 
indebtedness remains unsatisfied at the time the creditor attempts to enforce the guaranty, it could 
be concluded that the $300 guaranteed was part of the $500 already paid. If such an argument 
were accepted by the court, the guarantor could be completely released from liability. To avoid 
such a result, the standard form of unlimited guaranty should be used with the addition of lan-
guage to the effect that the guarantor's liability under the guaranty is limited to the specified 
amount. For a recent case in which the foregoing analysis was apposite, see Memphis Sheraton 
Corp. v. Kirkley, 640 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1981). 
11. See infra text accompanying notes 16-22. 
12. See Howell v. Comm'r, 69 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1934). The court noted in Howell that ''the , 
liability of a guarantor is secondary and collateral, and its enforcement depends upon certain 
conditions. The liability of a surety is original, primary and direct." I d. at 450. See also Picket v. 
Rigsbee, 252 N.C. 200, 113 S.E.2d 323 (1960); S.N.M.L. Corp. v. Bank of N.C., 41 N.C. App. 28, 
254 S.E.2d 274 (1979). See generally L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP 6 
(1950); Radin, Guaranty and Suretyship, 11 CALIF. L. REv. 605 (1929); Note, The Waiver of .De-
fenses by Guarantors in Guaranty Contracts and the Nonwaiver Provisions of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 5 VT. L. REv. 73 (1980). The article will not consider the impact of suretyship law. 
13. Commentators have considered the corporate law issues surrounding contracts of guar-
anty, particularly the ultra vires doctrine. See Bird, The Guaranty: A .Dilemma for Corporate 
Managers, 23 Sw. LJ. 872 (1969); Coquillette, Guaranty of and Security for the .Debt of a Parent 
Corporation by a Subsidiary Corporation, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 433, 438-46 (1980); Kriedman, 
Tire Corporate Guaranty, 13 VAND. L. REv. 229 (1959); Note, Upstream Financing and the Use of 
the Corporate Guaranty, 53 NoTRE DAME LAW. 841 (1978); Note, The Corporate Guaranty Revis-
ited.· Upstream, .Downstream, and Beyon~A Statutory Approach, 32 RUT. L. REV. 312 (1979). 
See also Annot., 71 A.L.R. 3d 639 (1976). In order to avoid undue repetition, this article will not 
consider corporate law issues but will commend the reader to the exhaustive analyses cited above. 
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law of the several states.I4 There are, however, some state statutes that con-
front specific issues. IS Such statutes are not pervasive, and, for the most part, 
do little to promote uniformity among the states. This section of the article 
will explore the applicable contract law as the necessary foundation for any 
critical observations regarding contracts of guaranty. 
A. Terminology 
It is important at the outset to distinguish between a guaranty of payment 
and a guaranty of collection. Perhaps the clearest description of that distinc-
tion is found in section 3-416 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which 
is applicable in every jurisdiction in the United States:I6 
Contract of Guarantor 
(1) 'Payment guaranteed' or equivalent words added to a signature 
mean that the signer engages that if the instrument is not paid when 
due, he will pay it according to its tenor without resort by the holder 
to any other party. 
(2) 'Collection guaranteed' or equivalent words added to a signa-
ture mean that the signer engages that if the instrument is not paid 
when due, he will pay it according to its tenor, but only after the 
holder has reduced his claim against the maker or acceptor [principal 
debtor] to judgment and execution has been returned unsatisfied, or 
after the maker or acceptor has become insolvent or it is otherwise 
apparent that it is useless to proceed against him. 
(3) Words of guaranty which do not otherwise specify guarantee 
payment. 
While Article 3 of the UCC is directed specifically to matters of negotiable 
instrument law,I7 the distinction presented in section 3-416 is useful outside 
the body of law governing commercial paper.I8 The section provides a pre-
14. "Contracts of guaranty are subject to the ... general law of contract when not otherwise 
provided." O'Grady v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 296 N.C. 212, 220, 250 S.E.2d 587, 593 (1978). 
See also RESTATEMENT OF LAW OF SECURITY§ 82 comment g (1941). See generally Dole, Notice 
Requirements in Guaranty Contracts, 62 MICH. L. REV. 57 (1963). 
15. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 321-344 (1971); infra text accompanying notes 118-26. 
See also NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 
1961, at 279-80 (1961); supra note 3. 
16. While Louisiana has not adopted Articles 2 or 9, the State has chosen to join the rest of 
the nation insofar as commercial paper is concerned. 
17. See supra note 3. 
18. A guaranty of payment has been defined as an absolute undertaking to pay a debt at 
maturity if the principal obligor does not do so. Preferred Inv. Co. v. Westbrook, 174 N.W.2d 391, 
395 (Iowa 1970). Accord Midway Nat'l Bank v. Gustafson, 282 Minn. 73, 165 N.W.2d 218 (1969); 
Bank of Sun Prairie v. Opstein, 86 Wis. 2d 669, 273 N.W.2d 279 (1979); United States v. Klebe 
Tool & Die Co., 5 Wis. 2d 392, 92 N.W.2d 868 (1958). See Annot., 53 A.L.R. 2d 522 (1957); 
Annot., 14 A.L.R. 924 (1921). A guaranty of collection, on the other hand, is conditional. It 
merely binds the guarantor to pay if the claim guaranteed is not collectible by due diligence. 
Ammerman v. Miller, 488 F.2d 1285, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1973); accord Schaeffer v. Gilmer, 353 So. 
2d 847 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Northwestern Bank v. Cortner, 275 So. 2d 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1973); American Bank & Trust Co. v. Blue Bird Restaurant & Lounge, Inc., 279 So.2d 720 
(La. Ct. App. 1973); State Bank v. Porter, 167 N.W.2d 527 (N.D. 1969);seealso supra note 7. For 
cases distinguishing between the two forms of guaranty, see State Bank v. Porter, 167 N.W.2d 527 
(N.D. 1969); Robey v. Walter Lumber Co., 17 Wash. 2d 242, 135 P.2d 95 (1943). 
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sumption in favor or reading a signature (perhaps indorsement) as constituting 
a guaranty of payment. 19 The crucial difference between a gauranty of pay-
ment and a guaranty of collection involves the procedural prerequisite to en-
forcement of the guaranty. The creditor who ha~ received the guaranty of 
collection must prosecute his claim against the principal debtor to judgment 
(and perhaps beyond) with "due diligence"20 before he may collect from the 
guarantor.21 That precondition involves potentially significant time and ex-
pense and forces the creditor to make numerous tactical decisions, any one or 
more of which may be attacked as manifesting something less than "due 
diligence. "22 
Courts often strictly construe guaranties of collection to deny recovery 
against the guarantor. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently 
found a "final decision" lacking in M. W. Zack Metal v. International Naviga-
tion Corp. of Monrovia .23 The guaranty provided that "the undersigned com-
pany herewith guarantees to pay upon first request the agreed sum, plus 
interest and costs, in the amount to which the plaintiff is entitled pursuant to a 
final decision of the German courts or on basis of a settlement agreement."24 
Because the German appeals court had failed to make an accounting of costs 
and interest, the court of appeals held that there was no "final decision" as 
intended by the contract of guaranty. The court was not persuaded by the 
argument that the assessment of interest and costs was a mere clarification of 
the extent of the guarantor's liability25 rather than a prerequisite determina-
tion that a "final decision" had been rendered.26 
While a survey of the issues surrounding prejudgment remedies, post-
judgment remedies, and the interstices of such procedures is outside the scope 
of this article, in general the practical difficulties that attend such collection 
devices mitigate in favor of avoiding guaranties of collection at all costs. The 
19. Compare Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. McRae, 81 Cal. App. 2d 1, 183 P.2d 
385 (1947) [and] Rucker v. Republic Supply Co., 415 P.2d 951 (Okla. 1966) (both finding a pre-
sumption in favor of reading a guaranty as absolute) with Liquidating Midland Bank v. Stecker, 
40 Ohio App. 510, 179 N.E. 504 (1930) (in which the court found that use of the word "guaranty" 
suggests a conditional rather than absolute obligation to pay). 
20. See Greene v. Martin W. Hysong Co., 193 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1963); First Nat'l Bank v. 
Southern Cotton Oil Co., 76 Ga. App. 779, 47 S.E.2d 288 (1948); U.S. Rubber Co. v. Champs 
Tires, Inc., 73 NJ. Super. 364, 180 A.2d 145 (App. Div. 1962). 
21. If the creditor does not pursue the claim against the principal debtor with due diligence, 
the creditor will not be able to maintain an action against the guarantor. Such lack of due dili-
gence may have also prejudiced the guarantor's subrogation right, see i'!fra text accompanying 
notes 49-58, and thereby released the guarantor. See also Schaeffer v. Gilmer, 353 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Keller v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 233 La. 320, 96 So. 2d 598 
(1957); Bank of Kirkwood Plaza v. Mueller, 294 N.W.2d 640 (N.D. 1980); Van Petten v. Oregon 
Bank, 42 Or. App. 367, 600 P.2d 507 (1979). 
22. For example, if the creditor delays the initiation of litigation against the principal debtor 
in hopes of reaching an out of court settlement, the creditor may be found to have: shown less than 
due diligence if the delay turns out to have compromised the creditor's litigation posture. 
23. 675 F.2d 525 (1982). 
24. Id at 530 n.7. 
25. See id at 530-32 (Cardamone, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
26. For North Carolina cases that deal with the crucial distinction between guaranties of 
payment and collection, see Investment Properties v. Norbum, 281 N.C. 191, 188 S.E.2d 342 
(1972); Arcady Farms Milling Co. v. Wallace, 242 N.C. 686, 89 S.E.2d 413 (1955); American Bank 
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problems associated with enforcing collection guaranties mandate that they 
only be used when competitive factors absolutely require. In light of the typi-
cal negotiating posture between creditor (stronger) and debtor (weaker), com-
petitive factors seldom so require. Thus, the form of guaranty used most 
typically by creditors is a guaranty of payment. 
The creditor will insist upon a continuing guaranty when a sequence of 
advances27 are to be made to the principal debtor.28 Such a guaranty is not 
restricted to a simple isolated transaction and may be effective for an indefinite 
time until revoked. Guaranty contracts in commercial finance transactions29 
are typically continuing because such transactions contemplate future ad-
vances30 to the principal obligor over the term of the credit agreement.31 
B. .Defenses to Guaranty Liability 
Perhaps as a result of a judicial preference for debtors or lawmakers' fear 
of creditor oyetteaching, or a combination of the two, the enactment of statu-
tory law and the evolution of common law have betrayed a discernible defer-
ence to any party that becomes obligated to answer for the debt of another.32 
Many of the cases may be reconciled only by concluding that when confronted 
with a guarantor who elicits sympathy, the courts are willing to find numerous 
reasons to abrogate the guaranty contract. This sentimental deference- to the 
plight of the guarantor has seldom been the source of venerable legal princi-
ples.33 The courts are not always careful in articulating the bases of their 
& Trust Co. v. Elzey, 26 N.C. App. 29, 214 S.E.2d 800, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 252, 217 S.E.2d 662 
(1975); First Nat'l Bank v. Black, 10 N.C. App. 270, 178 S.E.2d 108 (1970). 
27. UCC § 9-204(3) (1978) validates "future advances": "In line with the policy of this 
Article toward after-acquired property interests this subsection validates the future advance inter-
est, provided only that the obligation be covered by the security agreement." /d. comment 5. 
28. "Where by the terms of the written guaranty it appears that the parties look to a future 
course of dealing or a succession of credits, it is generally considered a continuing guaranty." 
Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Cassidy, 275 ill. 462, 465, 114 N.E. 181, 184 (1916). See supra note 9. 
29. Commercial finance transactions are defined as those "secured lending relationships in-
volving loans secured by accounts receivable, with or without other collateral." PRACTICINO LAW 
INST., COMMERCIAL FINANCE, FACTORING AND OTHER AssET-BASED LENDINO 11 (1980). In 
general usage, commercial finance is understood as encompassing asset-based lending, lending 
against the strength of the debtor's assets, and not his general reputation, business performance, or 
capability. See generally id. 
30. The typical future advance clause will be found in the definition section of the loan 
agreement under the caption "Indebtedness,'' "Liabilities,'' or "Obligations." The .P.ertinent part 
of a "Liabilities" definition may read as follows: " 'Liabilities' shall refer to all liabilities, obliga· 
tions, and indebtedness of any and every kind, whether heretofore, now, or hereafter owing, aris-
ing, due or payable from Borrower to Lender." The security interest, then, will be granted to 
secure those "Liabilities." 
31. Typically the loan is extended to provide the borrower with working capital, as opposed 
to asset or stock acquisition funding. 
32. The statutes of frauds in virtually every state require all contracts that answer for the debt 
of another to be in writing to be enforceable. See, e.g., Warren v. White, 251 N.C. 729, 112 S.E.2d 
522 (1960) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-1 (as then in effect; current version, 1965)). 
33. If the sentiment of the North Carolina Supreme Court in O'Grady v. First Union Nat'l 
Bank, 296 N.C. 212, 250 S.E.2d 587 (1978), is an accurate indication, creditors taking guaranties in 
the state should be most careful. In O'Grady the supreme court invoked the rules that "the terms 
of a written contract are to be construed most strongly against the party who drafted the instru· 
ment." id. at 227, 250 S.E.2d at 597 (citing Jones v. Palace Realty Co., 226 N.C. 303, 305, 37 
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decisions or in cogently applying the available doctrines.34 
The only practical response by creditors' legal counsel necessarily resem-
bles something of a shotgun approach. Corporate and commercial attorneys 
have drafted guaranty forms that are designed to avoid the proguarantor law. 
Many of the terms of such guaranties seem tautological because they are 
closely related to or are even mere permutations of the defenst:s to guaranty 
liability that they are intended to obviate. It must be reiterated that all of the 
defenses are not available in all jurisdictions. 
I. Creditor Action that Increases Guarantor's Risk 
It is generally understood that the contract of guaranty is separate and 
distinct from the contract between the creditor and the principal debtor.35 
Practically speaking, however, that distinction has received uneven treatment 
in some jurisdictions. In many cases, if the principal obligation is extin-
guished, the guarantor's obligation is also extinguished.36 Similarly, a classic 
defense recognized by the courts arises when the creditor in some way fails to 
honor its obligation to the debtor.37 A guarantor may, by the assertion of that 
defense, avoid part or all of his liability to the creditor.38 
A New York case provides a useful illustration of this type of defense to 
guaranty liability. In Walcutt v. Clevite Corp. 39 the New York Court of Ap-
peals drew a subtle distinction between a guarantor's assertion of an independ-
ent cause of action existing in favor of his principal as a defense or 
counterclaim,40 and a defense to liability based on a total or partial failure of 
S.E.2d 906, 907 (1946)), and ''the liability of a guarantor is not to be enlarged beyond the strict 
terms of the contract," id at 227, 250 S.E.2d at 597 (citing George D. Witt Shoe Co. v. Peacock, 
150 N.C. 448, 449, 64 S.E. 437, 438 (1909)) to reach a very proguarantor result arguably founded 
on grammatical niceties rather than thoughtful legal analysis. 
34. See, e.g., Manufacturers Trading Corp. v. Harding, 181 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1950); i'!fra 
text accompanying notes 62-63. 
35. Riverside Nat'! Bank v. Manolakis, 613 P.2d 438,441 (Okla. 1980). Several North Caro-
lina decisions have acknowledged that a guaranty is collateral to the creditor-principal debtor 
contract and creates secondary liability. See, e.g., EAC Credit Corp. v. Wilson, 281 N.C. 140, 144, 
187 S.E.2d 752,754 (1972); Perfecting Serv. Co. v. Product Dev. & Sales Co., 259 N.C. 400,418, 
131 S.E.2d 9, 23 (1963) (citing 24 AM. JuR. Guaranty§ 11, at 879-80 (1939) (guaranty re9.uires two 
contracts, one binding the principal debtor, and the other engaging the responsibility of the 
guarantor). 
36. Woods-Tucker Leasing v. Kellum, 641 F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Central 
Soya Co. v. Epstein Fisheries, Inc., 676 F.2d 939, 943 (7th Cir. 1982). 
37. See also 10 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1213 (3d ed. 1967). q. Keystone Acceptance 
Corp. v. Dynalectron Corp., 445 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (creditor barred from recovering from 
guarantor when creditor does not completely fulfill the agreement with principal debtor); Credit 
Managers Ass'n v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 392, 124 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1975) (guarantor may 
assert any defense that the principal debtor could assert). 
38. For discussion of partial or complete discharge of guarantors of negotiable instruments, 
see Provident Bank v. Gast, 57 Ohio St. 2d 102, 386 N.E.2d 1357 (1979); Note, Discharge of Guar-
antors Under U.C.C. § 3-606-Total or Pro-Rata Discharge Upon Release of Another Guarantor, 9 
CAP. U.L. REv. 365 (1979). 
39. 13 N.Y.2d 48, 191 N.E.2d 894, 241 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1963). 
40. The court observed: 
The situation [in the instant case) is readily distinguishable from cases in which the rule 
was fashioned that a guarantor when sued alone by the creditor cannot avail himself of 
an independent cause of action existing in favor of his principal as a defense or counter-
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the creditor to perform obligations due the principal debtor. The facts of the 
case are sufficiently complex to warrant discussion. The three plaintiffs were 
sole shareholders41 of several corporations dealing in phonographic supplies. 
In February of 1959 plaintiffs sold their stock to defendant Clevite Corpora-
tion (Clevite) in return for stock in Clevite and signed noncompetition agree-
ments with a ten-year duration. Plaintiff Walcutt also agreed to provide 
certain consulting services for $20,000 per year. The remaining plaintiffs were 
each to receive $10,000 per year for each of the ten years. Although the agree-
ments were assignable, they also provided that Clevite would remain liable in 
the event the assignee defaulted.42 
In September of 1960 Clevite sold the assets of the phonographic supply 
business to one Richmond with the understanding that Richmond would form 
a new corporation, Walco Electronics Company, Inc. (Walco) and transfer the 
assets to Walco. The new corporation, in tum, assumed the liability to plain-
tiffs. When Walco defaulted on the payments, plaintiffs brought suit against 
Clevite (for breach of the payment provisions of the noncompetition agree-
ments) and against Richmond on his personal guaranty to Clevite of the pay-
ment obligation under the agreements assumed by Walco.43 Richmond 
responded that Clevite (the "creditor") made fraudulent representations to 
Richmond (the "guarantor") and Walco (the "debtor") concerning the assets 
transferred and, that relying upon such representations and warranties, Rich-
mond and Walco were "induced to have Walco purchase the said [sic] inven-
tories and other assets."44 Essentially, Richmond alleged inventory shortages, 
a defense of partial failure of consideration. 
The court framed the issue in this way: "[W]hether a guarantor, when 
sued alone, may avail himself of the defense of a partial failure of considera-
tion arising out of the main contract."45 The opinion acknowledged that there 
is no difficulty in those circumstances in which the creditor totally fails to per-
form its obligations to the principal debtor.46 The court went further, however 
and held that "[w]here the consideration fails, either partially or entirely, 
neither the principal debtor nor the guarantor is accountable for anything 
claim • . . . Thus a guarantor may not interpose his principal's defense of fraud since 
by doing so he would deprive the principal of his independent right to affirm or disaffirm 
. . . . Likewise, he may not assert his principal's claim of breach of warranty since "he 
might thus bar a large claim in cancelling a small one." 
Id at 55, 191 N.E.2d at 897,241 N.Y.S.2d at 838 (quoting Gillespie v. Torrance, 25 N.Y. 306, 311 
(1862) and citing Ettlinger v. Nat'1 Surety Co., 221 N.Y. 467,468, 117 N.E. 945, 946 (1917)); Elliot 
v. Brady, 192 N.Y. 221, 85 N.E. 69 (1908); Lasher v. Williamson, 55 N.Y. 619 (1874); Gillespie v. 
Torrance, 25 N.Y. 306 (1862)). 
41. The fourth shareholder died prior to the co=encement of the trial. 13 N.Y.2d at 52, 
191 N.E.2d at 895, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 835. 
42. Id at 54, 191 N.E.2d at 897, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 836. 
43. The court noted, "P1aintitl's claims ... are based upon the theory that they are third-
party beneficiaries of Richmond's guarantee to Clevite, and, as such, are subject to all the equities 
between the parties to that agreement." Id at 54, 191 N.E.2d at 897, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 837 (citing 
Detmer Woolen Co. v. Van Horn, 59 Misc. 163, 110 N.Y.S. 312 (1908)). 
44. 13 N.Y.2d at 54, 191 N.E.2d at 896, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 837. 
45. Id at 55, 191 N.E.2d at 897, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 838 (emphasis added). 
46. See 10 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1264 (3d ed. 1967). 
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which has not been received."47 Under this approach the guarantor may par-
tially avoid its liability to the creditor. In light of the basic contract doctrine 
relied on by the New York Court of Appeals, it is unclear whether a creditor 
would be able to "contract-away" such a result when a guarantor asserts par-
tial or complete failure of consideration.48 That does not, however, mean that 
creditors cannot or, will not try to preclude the interposition of such a defense 
by drafting an appropriate waiver into their form of guaranty.49 
In O'Grady v. First Union National Bank50 the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina considered a situation in which the guarantors by their execution of 
the form of guaranty provided by the bank undertook to guarantee the per-
formance of three principal debtors. Because of an irregularity in the bank's 
documentation of the transaction, only two, rather than the intended three 
debtors, were primarily liable on the debt. The court cited North Carolina 
authority for the proposition that "a material alteration of a contract between 
principal and creditor will discharge a surety .... 51 The omittance or re-
lease of a principal destroys a surety's rights of subrogation against that princi-
pal."52 The court applied this rule to permit the guarantor to avoid any liabil-
ity whatsoever on the guaranty. 
To avoid releasing the guarantor a creditor must not in any way compro-
mise the guarantor's subrogation right. In Sterling Factors Corp. v. Free!i}pn 53 
a New York court held that the creditor's failure to protect the guarantor's 
subrogation right released the guarantor. The court found in favor of the 
guarantor because the creditor's actions had effectively released the collateral 
securing the principal debt, rendering the guarantor's subrogation right worth-
less. 54 Similarly, in First Bank and Trust Co. v. Post55 the court held that the 
47. 13 N.Y.2d at 56, 191 N.E.2d at 897, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 838. 
48. See also Manufacturers Trading Corp. v. Harding 181 F.2d 609, 611 (7th Cir. 1950). 
49. The form of guaranty could provide: ''The guarantor agrees that its obligations under 
this guaranty shall be absolute and unconditional, irrespective of any defenses available to the 
principal debtor arising under that certain Loan and Security Agreement between the Creditor 
and the principal debtor of even date herewith." Standardized forms of guaranty often provide 
that the guarantor's obligations shall be absolute and unconditional, irrespective of "any circum-
stance which might otherwise constitute a legal or equitable discharge or defense of or by a guar-
antor." It is suggested that such a term may be so broad as to be unenforceable, perhaps on 
grounds of unconscionability. A court might very well be more willing to enforce the waiver of a 
defense if the defense were more particularly described in the form signed by the guarantor. 
The complaints of"unfortunate" lenders notwithstanding, there does exist a sound legal basis 
for requiring a creditor to treat his principal obligor with considerable deference. The common 
law provides that a guarantor who discharges the obligation of the principal debtor is subrogated 
to the claim of the creditor to the extent that the guarantor has contributed to the discharge. See 
United States v. Frisk, 675 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Ballard, 674 F.2d 330 (5th 
Cir. 1982); Phares v. Barbour, 49 ill. 370 (1868); RE.A. Constr. Co. v. Ervin Co., 33 N.C. App. 
472, 235 S.E.2d 418 (1977); W. DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 239 (2d ed. 1956); 
RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY§ 132 (1941). See also discussion ofUCC § 3-606 (1978),supra note 
3. 
50. 296 N.C. 212, 250 S.E.2d 587 (1978). 
51. Id at 224, 250 S.E.2d at 598 (citing Fleming v. Borden, 127 N.C. 214, 215, 37 S.E. 219, 
220 (1900); Hinton v. Greenleaf, 113 N.C. 6, 7, 18 S.E. 56, 57 (1893)). 
52. 296 N.C. at 224, 250 S.E.2d at 598. 
53. 50 Misc. 2d 715, 271 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1966). 
54. See also Osborne v. Smith, 18 F. 126 (D. Minn. 1883). 
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creditor's failure to file a financing statement56 constituted a significant im-
pairment of the security for the principal obligor's debt and effected a release 
of the guarantor. 57 Again, a creditor may avoid releasing the guarantor in 
such a situation if the guaranty contract provides that the guarantor will re-
main bound notwithstanding the creditor's failure to perfect his security inter-
est in the collateral securing the principal debtor's obligation.58 
A particularly interesting case dealing with the effect of increased risk to 
guarantors is State Bank of East Moline v. Gus Cirivello,59 a 1978 decision of 
the lllinois Supreme Court. Thirteen parties intended to sign as coguarantors 
of a loan extended by the plaintiff bank. Ultimately, however, only twelve 
signatures appeared on the guaranty. The form of guaranty used by the bank 
provided that the guaranty was unconditional. The court did not feel con-
strained by the language of the guaranty contract and held that the execution 
of the form by all of the originally-intended guarantors constituted a condition 
precedent to the liability of any of the guarantors. Each of the actual guaran-
tor's risk was increased because there were only twelv~ instead of thirteen 
guarantors among whom the risk could be apportioned.60 
Perhaps carrying a good idea too far, courts have also granted guarantors 
relief when there is any modification whatsoever of the contract between the 
creditor and the principal debtor unless the consent of the guarantor is first 
55. 10 ill. App. 3d 127, 293 N.E.2d 907 (1973). 
56. See UCC § 9-402 (1978), describing the elements of a financing statement. 
57. See also Piasecki v. Fidelity Corp., 339 Mich. 328, 330, 63 N.W.2d 671, 673 (1954). But 
see American Bank of Co=erce v. Covolo, 88 N.M. 405, 540 P.2d 1294 (1975), in which the 
court found that the creditor-bank's failure to properly perfect a collateral interest in a li9.uor 
license with the State Beverage Control Department did not absolv'e the guarantors of liability. 
58. Such a waiver may be phrased in substantially these terms: 
The guarantor agrees that its obligations hereunder shall be absolute and unconditional 
irrespective of any failure by the Creditor to take any steps to preserve its rights to any 
security or collateral for the Liabilities or the release of all or any portion of the collat-
eral by the Creditor or the Creditor's failure to perfect or keep perfected its security 
interest or lien in any portion of the collateral. 
59. 74 ill. 2d 426, 386 N.E.2d 43 (1978). 
60. See Miami Nat'l Bank v. Fink, 174 So. 2d 38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (guaranty unen-
forceable against guarantor when condition that the SBA participate m loan as guarantor re-
mained unfulfillecl); U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Sampson, 496 S.W.2d 687 (rex. Civ. App. 1973) (where 
guaranty agreement is joint rather than joint and several, the release of one of the joint obligors 
operates as a release of the other joint obligors). But see Co=ercial Credit Corp. v. Sorge!, 274 
F.2d 449 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 834 (dismissal with prejudice of two of three coguaran-
tors does not release the third guarantor); Williams v. Reed, 113 Cal. At>P· 2d 195, 248 P.2d 147 
(1952) (Release of one joint guarantor of a promissory note does not extmguish the obligation of 
any of the others); Oil Tool Exch. v. Schuh, 67 Cal. App. 2d 288, 153 P.2d 976 (1944) (The satis-
faction of a judgment against one guarantor does not release another guarantor from liability); 
Hall v. First Nat'l Bank, 145 Ga. App. 267, 243 S.E.2d 569 (1978) (discharge of two guarantors 
through refusal to accept their tenders does not ipso facto result in discharge of a third guarantor). 
A 1979 decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals construed the effect of a coguarantor's 
termination of his guaranty obligation on the nonterminating guarantor's liability. The court 
found that the nonterminating guarantor's liability was not extinguished. The coguarantors were 
not '5ointly responsible for a particular amount of credit extended to the corporation, but instead 
..• each of them [was) liable to a maximum of $10,000, just as if a separate guaranty had been 
signed by each of them." Pearce Young Angel Co. v. Don Becker Enter., Inc., 43 N.C. App. 690, 
694, 260 S.E.2d 104, 106 (1979). 
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obtained.61 An example of such a result is found in a decision of the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals, Mamifacturers Trading Corp. v. Harding.62 Plaintiff 
finance company purchased and took assignments of accounts receivable from 
Skandia, and Harding indemnified plaintiff against any loss resulting from the 
assignment of the accounts. The accounts were fraudulent. At Skandia's re-
quest plaintiff had assigned the accounts to a third party, and when it was 
discovered that the accounts were not genuine, plaintiff and the third-party 
assignee reached a compromise agreement. The assignment to the third party 
was accomplished through a reassignment to Skandia and an immediate as-
signment to the third party. The court held: 
[i]nasmuch as the guarantors and the indemnifiers had merely agreed 
to guarantee the collection of the accounts receivable and to protect 
plaintiff against loss, when plaintiff was completely reimbursed for its 
original outlay and the subject matter of the contract redelivered to 
Skandia, the liability of the guarantors ended ... . [The guarantors] 
never made any guaranty of protection of plaintiff against liability 
for its own misrepresentation.63 
Thus, the modification of the contract between the creditor and the principal 
debtol' released the guarantors. Certainly it ma)C be argued that the reassign-
ment in Harding represents an extreme type of "modification"; nevertheless, it 
is difficult to justify the result reached by the court. It appears that the equities 
did not lie with the guarantors, who were afforded significant protection by the 
court, but with the plaintiff who was the victim of fraud. As the opinion does 
not reproduce the form of guaranty used by Manufacturers Trading Corpora-
tion, however, it is not clear whether a Harding result could be precluded by a 
careful, complete drafting of the guaranty and a particularly indulgent solici-
tude of the guarantor's rights over the course of the credit relationship when-
ever there is the slightest possibility that those rights might be implicated. It 
would appear that the reasoning in Harding could obtain even if the modifica-
tion benefits the guarantor, by reducing either the likelihood of principal 
debtor default or the extent of the guarantor's potential liability. 
The foregoing cases suggest that a creditor's arguments, no matter how 
reasonable, might not prevail when directed at a guarantor favored by th~J 
court. How, then, may a creditor safely deal with the many modifications and/ 
waivers that are typically encountered during the course of a credit relation-
ship? Though by no means a safe harbor, a creditor can place some reliance 
on the guarantor's advance consent (at the time the guaranty is executed) to 
any and all modifications..and-waiv~rs; such consent would naturally be a pro-
vision of .the guaranty form itself. Attorneys should not be reluctant to de-
scribe explicitly the modifications and waivers to which the guarantor is being 
61. The guaranty form may contain a provision pursuant to which the guarantor acknowl-
edges that no modification of the contract between the creditor and the principal debtqr will affect 
the liability of the guarantor. Courts confronted with partial or total failure of the consideration 
flowing to the debtor from the creditor may not feel constrained by such a waiver clause. See 
supra text accompanying notes 3949. 
62. 181 F.2d 609 (1950). 
63. Id at 611-12. 
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asked to give his prior consent; the use of examples would be entirely 
appropriate. 64 
In any event, advance consent will not be relied upon to the exclusion of 
other safeguards. Written consents are obtained from all guarantors when the 
terms of the contract between the creditor and principal debtor are altered in 
any way.65 In fact, a written acknowledgement could be secured from the 
guarantor each time the principal debtor requests a waiver of a contract 
term.66 
2. Notice Requirements 
Some courts have shown concern with the creditor's failure to afford his 
guarantor notice of certain occurrences that may arise in common guaranty 
transactions. Failure to give a guarantor notice when notice is required either 
by the terms of the guaranty contract, the loan agreements, the common law, 
or applicable statutory law67 can release the guarantor. 68 There are three 
principal types of notice that may become pertinent to almost any guaranty 
transaction: (1~ notice of acceptance, (2) notice of subsequent transactions,69 
and (3) notice of default or enforcement action against the principal debtor. 
a. Notice of Acceptance 
The requirement of notice of acceptance is consistent with the idea that a 
contract of guaranty, like any other type of contract, requires a "meeting of the 
minds," an agreement by both parties. Therefore, the courts have occasionally 
considered the guarantor's execution of a guaranty to be an "offer," which 
must be expressly "accepted" prior to its revocation by the proposed guaran-
tor. ''Notice of intention to accept is notice to the guarantor by the creditor 
that the latter intends to extend credit in reliance on the guaranty. Its purpose 
is to enable the guarantor to plan his affairs intelligently. . . . Notice of in-
tention to accept ... is necessarily contractual in theory."70 This is not a 
64. Most extensions of credit to which the particular creditor is party give rise to predictable 
later modifications. The fairly detailed catalogue of credit re~uirements, any one or more of 
which may be modified or waived during the course of a credit relationship, should provide a 
ready source of examples which the contract of guaranty could specifically bring to the attention 
of the guarantor. 
65. Such alterations are normally requested in writing by the principal debtor and may only 
be accepted by the creditor in writing. When the written request for modification or waiver IS 
received by the creditor, a copy of the request could be sent to the guarantor with an accompany-
ing letter requiring the guarantor to object or consent to the alteration and to attach its (the guar-
antor's) signature to the request letter itself with the notation "approved" or "disapproved" above 
the signature. That type of clear indication of the guarantor's response to a modification or waiver 
request would likely be difficult evidence for a court to ignore. 
66. It may very well be good practice for the creditor to apprise the guarantor of the debtor's 
request even when the creditor has no intention of approving the request. 
67. Most forms of guaranty and loan agreements prepared by creditors will contain no such 
notice requirement. Certainly it is more likely that they will contain waivers of notice. For dis· 
cussions of waiver of notice of acceptance, see Hickey Pipe & Supply Co. v. Fitzgerald, 3 Cal. 
App. 2d 389, 39 P.2d 472 (1934); Wehle v. Baker, 97 Ga. App. l11, 102 S.E.2d 661 (1958); Gug· 
genheimer & Co. v. Gilmore, 29 Ga. App. 540, 116 S.E. 67 (1923). 
68. See generally 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 68-69, at 283-87 (1963). 
69. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66. 
70. Dole, Notice Requirements of Guaranty Contracts, 62 MICH. L. REV. 57, 59-60 (1963). In 
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provocative area of the law.71 The rules are rather clear cut and readily lend 
themselves to coherent analysis. 
Notice of acceptance may be waived by the guarantor when he executes 
the guaranty contract.72 If the guaranty is absolute in form, as when the form 
is labelled "Absolute Guaranty'' or merely recites in the text that it is an abso-
lute guaranty, the prevailing view provides that no notice of acceptance is nec-
essary.73 There is also statutory law to the same effect.74 A waiver of 
acceptance is necessarily drafted into any guaranty form that contains a recita-
tion of the consideration flowing to the guarantor. A nominal consideration is 
sufficient ("for good and valuable consideration") to evidence the mutual as-
sent, or "meeting of the minds."75 Mere delivery of the guaranty to the guar-
antor will suffice to form the contractual relationship.76 In addition, and 
consistent with commercial reality, acceptance often may be inferred: if, with 
the guarantor's knowledge, the guaranty is received and relied upon by the 
creditor, the acceptance requirement is satisfied. 77 Most often the guaranty 
will be executed in response to the creditor's request and the principal contract 
or loan agreement will be contemporaneous with the guaranty, in which case 
no additional notice of acceptance is required.78 
It has been held that acceptance of a continuing guaranty79 at the time the 
guaranty is originally offered does not obviate the need for notice of accept-
ance when the creditor negotiates subsequent advances or extensions of the 
original indebtedness.80 The better view, however, provides that unless a 
the typical transaction, the guarantor may be a principal of the debtor and is, in fact, well aware of 
the creditor's "acceptance" of the guaranty. See also Campbell, The Notice .Due to a Guarantor, 35 
MICH. L. REv. 529 (1937); Rogers, Notice of Acceptance in Contracts of Guaranty, 5 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 215 (1905). 
71. See Dole, supra note 70, at '66, wherein the tension between the "condition precedent" 
and the "condition subsequent" methods of acceptance analysis is disposed of as "indistinguish-
able apart from verbal formulation" (citing H. ARANT, SURETYSHIP§ 26, at 69 (1931)). See gener-
ally 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 69A, at 219-22 (3d ed. 1957). 
72. See Dole, supra note 70, at 67, and authority cited therein. It should be noted, however, 
that acceptance itself is not waived by mere waiver of notice of acceptance. See also Guggen-
heimer & Co. v. Gilmore, 29 Ga. App. 540, 116 S.E. 67 (1923). 
73. Wehle v. Baker, 97 Ga. App. 111, 102 S.E.2d 661 (1958); Motor Supply Co. v. Hunter, 
251 Miss. 837, 171 So. 2d 870 (1965); Clear Fir Sales Co. v. Carolina Plywood Distrib., Inc., 13 
N.C. App. 429, 185 S.E.2d 737 (1972); Cobb v. Texas Distrib., Inc., 524 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1975); Robey v. Walton Lumber Co., 17 Wash. 2d 242, 135 P.2d 95 (1943); In re Estate of 
Mingesz, 70 Wis. 2d 734, 235 N.W.2d 296 (1975). 
74. See the courts' consideration of applicable statutory law in Thorpe v. Story, 10 Cal. 2d 
104, 117-18, 73P.2d 1194, 1202 (1937); Abbott v. National Bank of Commerce, 176 Okla. 629, 6~0, 
56 P.2d 886, 887 (1936); Burns v. Ferguson, 576 P.2d 784, 786 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977); Continental 
Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 56 S.D. 410, 412, 228 N.W. 809, 810 (1930). 
75. See Huckaby v. McConnon & Co., 213 Ala. 631, 634, 105 So. 886, 888 (1925); Barnett 
Bank v. Marable, 385 So. 2d 66, 67 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); Shur-Gain Feed Div., William Davies 
Co. v. Huntsville Prod. Credit Ass'n, 372 So. 2d 1317, 1320 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979). See also John-
son v. Staenglen, 85 F. 603 (5th Cir. 1898). 
76. See Angelo Iafrate Co. v. Detroit & N. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, SO Mich. App. 508, 264 
N.W.2d 45 (1978). 
77. See Dole, supra note 70, at 76. 
78. Raw leigh, Moses & Co. v. Kornberg, 210 F.2d 176, 182 (8th Cir. 1954); Eastman Oil Well 
Survey Co. v. Hamil, 416 S.W.2d 597, 604-08 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). 
79. See supra note 9. 
80. See Security State Bank v. Gray, 224 Mo. App. 980, 25 S.W.2d 512 (1929). 
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guarantor of future advances specifically requires notice of acceptance, such 
notice is deemed to be waived.81 Also, if shown through a course ofperform-
ance,82 course of dealing, or perhaps even usage oftrade,83 that it is the credi-
tor's practice to accept guaranties from the guarantor, no notice of acceptance 
is necessary.84 
b. Notice of Subsequent Transactions 
This form of notice was suggested above in the discussion on modification 
of contract terms, 85 and even if it were not recognized as a "notice" require-
ment in all circumstances, a careful creditor should inform his guarantor of all 
significant transactions between the creditor and the principal debtor. Credit 
documentation routinely contains a clause providing the address to which no-
tices may be sent and some reasonable period of time after dispatch in the 
United States mails86 by which delivery will be presumed.87 It is generally 
assumed that the guarantor assents to the proposed transaction if he does not 
object after receiving notice. In reality, however, no responsible creditor's at-
torney would counsel his client to rely on such an assumption. A form of 
waiver or assent to the transaction88 should be provided by the creditor, along 
with a stamped, self-addressed envelope to accommodate immediate consent 
to the transaction. If the consent is not returned within a reasonable period of 
time, a telephone call should follow. Certainly this procedure is the safest. 
81. See Swisher v. Deering, 204 ill. 202, 205..07, 68 N.E. 517, 518 (1903); Southdale Center 
Inc. v. Lewis, 260 Minn. 430, 439, 110 N.W.2d 857, 863 (1961); National Bank v. Security Elevator 
Co., 161 Minn. 30, 41-42, 200 N.W. 851, 856 (1924). 
82. UCC § 2-208 (1978) provides, in pertinent part: 
Course of Performance or Practical Construction 
(1) · Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance by either 
party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to 
it by the other, any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection 
shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement. 
83. UCC § 1-205 (1978) provides, in pertinent part: 
Course of Dealing and Usage of Trade 
(1) A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a 
particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a co=on basis of 
understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct. 
(2) A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of 
observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be ob-
served with respect to the transaction in question. The eXIStence and scope of such a 
usage are to be proved as facts. Hit is established that such a usage is embodied in a 
written trade code or similar writing the interpretation of the writing is for the court. 
84. Swisher v. Deering, 204 Ill. 203, 68 N.E. 517 (1903). 
85. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66. 
86. A typical provision might read as follows: 
Notice. Any notice hereunder shall be in writing, and shall be deemed to have been 
validly served, given, or delivered five (5) calendar days following deposit in the U.S. 
Mails, with proper postage prepaid and properly addressed to the party to be notified. 
It is only reasonable that the creditor take into account postal and geographic realities when draft-
ing such a presumption. 
87. Courts may be more willing to observe such a presumption if the notice provision or 
creditor practice requires use of certified or registered maiL 
88. The waiver should be made to appear as pedestrian as possible. In this circumstance it 
:would be appropriate to avoid the use of word processing. A pretyped form with obvious blanks 
completed by hand might best achieve the effect intended. 
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Some states89 may require that notice be given to the guarantor on a regu-
lar basis to keep the guarantor apprised of the balance due on the principal 
debtor's account.90 Notice of any adjustment to payment terms is also a com-
mon form of subsequent transaction of which a guarantor should be apprised. 
The justification for both of these notice requirements would also be the neces-
sity of enabling the guarantor to order his affairs91 and the protection of the 
guarantor's subrogation right.92 Although it would likely not be necessary to 
receive the guarantor's approval of the balance due on the principal debtor's 
account,93 if a creditor and debtor decide to adjust payment terms, the written 
consent of the guarantor should be secured. 
Contemporary authority suggests that notice is not necessary unless the 
terms of the guaranty contract so provide.94 Nevertheless, because a recalci-
trant guarantor may be expected to grasp at any (even dubiously) available 
straw to avoid liability altogether or at least to delay collection efforts, the 
right to notice of subsequent transactions will be expressly waived in the form 
of guaranty.9s 
c. Notice of JJefau/t 
This aspect of notice requirements has been a focus of recent case law 
development. Several courts have held that a creditor must notify the guaran-
tor of the existence of a default by the principal debtor and of the creditor's 
89. See, e.g., Rapelye & Purdy v. Bailey, 3 Conn. 438 (1828) (guarantor must receive notice 
prior to each extension of credit); Babcock v. Bryant, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 133 (1831) (guarantor not 
liable until after reasonable notice that goods have been delivered under the contract guaranteed). 
Dole, supra note 70, at 85-86, suggests that the vitality of the rule is dubious because none of the 
cases providing for notice of transactions has been recently reaffirmed (citing Campbell, supra 
note 70, at 548). But see i'!fra text accompanying notes 96-111. 
90. In commercial finance and similar lending transactions strict enforcement of a notice of 
subsequent transactions requirement would require that the guarantors be sent a copy of the peri-
odic statement that is sent to the principal debtor. While that procedure would not present a 
particularly onerous burden to creditors, the cost would surely be passed on to the principal 
debtor. Moreover, that cost would quite often be unjustified because guarantors are very often the 
principals of the debtor or an affiliate or subsidiary of the principal debtor. See, e.g., Standard 
Roller Bearing Co. v. Bergdoll, 214 F. 175 (E.D. Pa. 1914); Boyd & Rickets v. Snyder, 49 Md. 325 
(1878); Gloucester Mut. Fishing Ins. Co. v. Boyer, 294 Mass. 35, 200 N.E. 557 (1936). 
91. See supra text accompanying note 71. 
92. See supra text accompanying notes 49-58. 
93. Because most loans have a "cap" on the amount the debtor may borrow, and the guaran-
tor's potential liability will be up to that amount, there would seem to be little need to keep the 
guarantor apprised of the balance due so long as the amount does not exceed the predetermined 
ceiling. See also supra note 10. 
94. See Dole, supra note 70, at 85-86; Campbell, supra note 70, at 548-50. See also REsTATE-
MENT {FIRST) OF CONTRACI'S § 56 (1923); REsTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 86 (1937). Perhaps the 
most convincing indication of the current attitude toward notice of subsequent transactions is the 
lack of any case holding such notice necessary in the absence of a guaranty specifically so 
providing. 
95. One possible wording to achieve this effect would be: 
Creditor is authorized, without notice or demand and without affecting the liability of 
the Guarantor under this Guaranty, from time to time to (I) extend credit or advance 
loans to principal debtor, (2) renew, extend, accelerate, or otherwise change the terms of 
the Loan Agreement, (3) accept partial payment of the Liabilities, and (4) settle, release, 
compromise, collect, or otherwise liquidate the Liabilities. Guarantor also waives all 
notice of the existence, creation, or incurring of new or additional indebtedness or obli-
gations by the principal debtor under the Loan Agreement. 
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intention to exercise rights against the debtor or against the collateral securing 
the debt.96 The issue is made particularly interesting by part five of Article 9 
of the UCC, which deals with the rights of parties to a secured loan when the 
debtor is in default.97 
Recent cases have equated a guarantor of secured debt to a secured 
debtor, one who "owes payment or other performance of the obligation se-
cured."98 Application of that conclusion has afforded such guarantors signifi-
cant protection. Nowhere has the sting of that reading of Article 9 been felt 
more profoundly than under the notice requirements of the UCC. Section 9-
504(3) provides in pertinent part: 
Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in 
value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, reason-
96. That requirement may be difficult to fulfill when the principal debtor is frequently in 
default (for technical rather than substantial reasons) and could l'ose practical problems in loan 
administration. Again, the concerns expressed with regard to nollce of transactions are apposite. 
See supra note 90. 
~ 97. Part five of UCC Article 9 contains the provisions dealing with the parties' rights upon 
default. While "default" is nowhere defined in the UCC, Professor Clark has catalogued four-
,teen events of default contained in typical loan and security agreements: 
(1) Failure to make an installment payment when due; 
(2) Failure to make payments on other obligations, whether or not cross-collateral-
ized, including overdrafts; 
(3) Breach of warranty that the debtor is the owner of the collateral free of any other 
encumbrance; • 
( 4) The filing of any competing financing statement against the collateral, even though 
it may be later; 
(5) Failure of the debtor to defend the collateral against any competing claims; 
(6) Sale of the collateral (except in ordinary course) without the creditor's prior writ-
ten consent; 
(/) Failure to keep the collateral adequately insured, with a loss payable clause run-
ning in favor of the secured creditor and the right of the creditor to make up any 
delinquent premiums and charge it to the unpaid debt; 
(8) Failure to allow the creditor to inspect the collateral upon demand at any reason-
able time; 
(9) Failure to make prompt payment of taxes on the collateral; 
(10) Loss, theft, substantial damage, or destruction of the collateral, or the making of 
any levy, attachment, or garnishment against it by a competitor; 
(11) Failure of ac:cOunt debtors to pay their obligations in due course when accounts 
receivable, executory contract rights, chattel paper, or instruments are involved, 
even in non-notification financing; 
(12) The debtor's death, dissolution, termination of existence, or insolvency (defined 
broadly to include (a) liabilities exceeding assets and (b) inability to pay debts as 
they come due); 
(13) Assignment for the benefit of creditors, appointment of a receiver, or the com-
mencement of bankruptcy proceedings by or against the debtor; and 
(14) Whenever the secured party 'in good faith believes that the prospect of payment, 
performance or realization on the collateral is impaired.' 
B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ~ 
4.2[1], at 4-5 (1980) (footnote omitted). The occurrence of default (13) would not be effective in 
the bankruptcy setting because of the provisions of§§ 365(b), (e), and (f)(3) of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(b), (e), (f)(3) (Supp. V 1981). That circumstance should 
not dissuade creditors from using the "ipso facto" or "bankruptcy" clauses altogether, however, 
because such clauses are still effective outside the bankruptcy context. 
98. UCC § 9-105(l)(d) (1978) defines "debtor," in part, as "the person who owes payment 
or performance of the obligation secured, whether or not he owns or has rights in the collateral, 
and includes the seller of accounts or chattel paper." 
HeinOnline -- 61 N.C. L. Rev. 671 1982-1983
1983] GUARANTY CONTRACTS 
able notification of the time and place of any public sale or reason-
able notification of the time after which any private sale or other 
intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party 
to the debtor, if he has not signed after default a statement renounc-
ing or modifying his right to notification of sale.99 
671 
In State Bank of Burleigh County Trost Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc. 100 the 
Supreme Court of North Dakota held that in all situations in which a creditor 
would be required by law to give notice of enforcement efforts to the principal 
debtor, the creditor must also give such notice to the guarantor, notwithstand-
ing the guarantor's predefault express waiver of notice in the guaranty con-
tract. An Alabama court, in First Alabama Bank of Montgomery, N.A. v. 
Parsons, 101 reached the same result. The court reasoned that because the un-
conditional guarantor would fit the definition of a "debto( under the UCC 
and because a guarantor would be liable for any deficiency after the sale of the 
collateral, the guarantor-had a sufficient stake in the "commercially reason-
able" 102 disposition of the collateral to require that he be afforded the same 
protections which the UCC assures the principal debtor. The court relied on a 
New York decision to support its conclusion: 
[t]he purpose of U.C.C. § 9-504(3) is to notify all persons having an 
interest in the collateral so that they may protect their interests. No-
tice of sale allows those persons to safeguard any right of redemp-
tion, to bid at the sale, to procure other bidders, or otherwise insure 
that a fair price is received for the collateral. Because a guarantor is 
liable for any deficiency after sale, he has at least as much at stake in 
a sale after default as the debtor does. 103 
Based on decisions such as the foregoing, it has been suggested that the clearly 
discernible trend 104 of recent authority extends Article 9 notice protections to 
guarantors. 105 
99. UCC § 9-504(3) (1978) (emphasis added): "Secured Party's Right to Dispose of Collat-
eral After Default; Effect of Disposition." 
100. 289 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1980). 
101. 390 So. 2d 640 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980). 
102. UCC § 9-504(3) (1978). "The test of commercial reasonableness is essentially an objec-
tive standard, which incorporates much pre-Code law but changes old judicial decisions holding 
that a sale in 'good faith' was sufficient." B. CLARK, supra note 97, ~ 4.7, at 4-46. See Empire Life 
Ins. Co. v. Valdak Corp., 468 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1972). See also S.M. Flickinger Co. v. 18 Genes-
see Corp., 71 A.D.2d 382, 423 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1979). See generally Annot., 59 A.L.R. 3o 369 (1974). 
103. 390 So. 2d at 642 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980) (citing Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Natarelli, 
93 Misc. 2d 78, -, 401 N.Y.S.2d 404, 412 (Sup. Ct. 1977)). 
104. See Commercial Discount Corp. v. King, 515 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ill. 1981); First Ala. 
Bank v. Parsons, 390 So. 2d 640 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); Clune Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Sprangler, 
615 S.W.2d 106 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Natarelli, 93 Misc. 2d 78, 
401 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1977); State Bank of Burleigh County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, 
Inc., 289 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1980). See also Rushton v. Shea, 423 F. Supp. 468 (D. Del. 1976); 
Barnett v. Barnett Bank, 345 So. 2d 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Bank of Gering v. Glover, 192 
Neb. 575, 223 N.W.2d 56 (1974); Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Hurst, 570 P.2d 1031 (Utah 1977). 
105. See Mack Fin. Corp. v. Scott, 100 Idaho 889, 606 P.2d 993 (1980). See generally Note, 
supra note 12, at 84. That turn of events is particularly disturbing for creditors, because it is likely 
that those rights which a debtor is not able to waive prior to default will, in turn, not be waivable 
by the guarantors at the time they execute the contract of guaranty. 
Section 9-501(3)(a) to (e) of the UCC: 
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Rather than abandon all hope, however, creditors would be well-advised 
to argue along the lines suggested by the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York in American Express International Banking Corp. v. 
Sahet. 106 The district court distinguished those cases in which "[t]he term 
'debtor' has been construed to extend beyond the owner of the collateral to a 
non-owner obligor such as a guarantor or other party with a right of recourse 
against the collateral, or claim for contribution or reimbursement. ... " 107 If 
the right to subrogation has been waived by the guarantor (which is a standard 
guaranty form provision)108 the creditor may successfully argue that the rea-
soning of the cases construing a section 9-lOS(l)(d) "debtor" to include a guar-
antor is effectively undermined. The Sahel court found that once the right of 
recourse against the collateral through subrogation, contribution, or reim-
bursement is avoided, it "makes little commercial sense" to afford the guaran-
tor the protection of section 9-504(3). 109 While that analysis is not 
prevent[s] the debtor from waiving certain important rights before default: (I) the right 
to require disposition of the collateral on default, (2) the right to notification of sale of 
the collateral, (3) the right to require that every aspect of the sale be commercially rea-
sonable, (4) the right to surplus proceeds, (5) the right to redeem the collateral before the 
secured party has disposed of it, contracted to dispose of it, or agreed to accept it in 
satisfaction of the debt, and (6) the right to hold the secured party liable for damages, 
including minimum statutory damages as provided in Section 9-507. 
R. BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 505 (1977) (em-
phasis in original). 
But decisions such as that of the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois in National Acceptance Co. of Am. v. Wechsler, 489 F. Supp. 642 (N.D. Ill. 1980), confirm 
that there is a well-reasoned minority view to the contrary: 
[T]he Court does not believe that a guarantor's status as a debtor under section 9-504(3) 
compels the conclusion that a guarantor may not waive the rights accorded thereunder. 
First, it should be observed that the collateral in question is not owned by the guarantor. 
Thus, while it may be unconscionable to permit a secured party ..• to dispose unrea-
sonably of a debtor's property, the same cannot be said as to a guarantor, who by defini-
tion has a lesser interest in that collateral. Second, the Court must consider the general 
purpose of guaranty agreements. Such agreements facilitate the issuance of loans by 
ensuring that the lender has a ready source from which it can collect in the event of 
default by the debtor. To this end, it would not be unusual for a lender to require a 
guarantor to waive objections to payment that otherwise might be available. The Court 
does not believe that section 9-501(3) was intended to preclude such agreements. 
489 F. Sufp. at 647-48. See also Vickers v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 158 Ga. App. 434, 280 S.E.2d 
842 (1981 (a guarantor may assert that collateral was not disposed of in a commercially reason-
able manner, but that does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a guarantor is a "debtor" 
entitled to notice of disposition of collateral); Commercial Discount Corp. v. Bayer, 57 Ill. App. 3d 
295, 298, 372 N.E.2d 926, 929 (1978) (suggesting that a guarantor could wa1ve rights that the 
principal debtor could not waive under part five of Article 9 of the UCC). 
106. 512 F. Supp. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
107. Id at 470-71 (citing Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Natarelli, 93 Misc. 2d 78, 401 
N.Y.S.2d404 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Northern Fin. Corp. v. Chatwood Coffee Shop, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 674 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967)). 
108. A typical provision might read as follows: 
Until the Liabilities shall have been paid in full, the Guarantor hereunder shall have no 
right of subrogation or contribution and hereby waives the right to enforce any remedy 
which the Creditor now has or hereafter may acquire against the principal debtor or any 
other guarantor of the Liabilities. 
109. 512 F. Supp. at 471. 
110. In First Ala. Bank v. Parsons, 390 So. 2d 640 (Ala. Civ .. App. 1980), the court found that a 
guarantor requires the protection of UCC § 9-504(3) (1978) "[b]ecause a guarantor is liable for 
any deficiency after sale [of the collateral]." 390 So. 2d at 642. In the face of that type of analysis, 
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unassailable, 110 the District Court for the Southern District of New York is 
too well-respected a commercial tribunal for creditors' counsel to ignore when 
trying to enforce a guaranty contract. ttl 
C. Winning the Battle of the Forms 
In light of the very apparent judicial preference for guarantors, creditors 
are often left with the impression that there is precious little they can to to 
safeguard their rights vis-a-vis guarantors. Contract-drafting limitations 
notwithstanding, 1I2 the cases have provided some support for the idea that a 
scrupulously composed contract o( guaranty may withstand the attack of even 
the most pitiable guarantor. 
A 1976 decision of an Illinois appellate court, Jacobson v. Devon Bank,II3 
considered a form of guaranty that provided: 
The liability hereunder shall in no wise be affected or impaired by 
(and said Bank is hereby expressly authorized to make from time to 
time, without notice to anyone) any sale, pledge, surrender, compro-
mise, release, renewal, extension, indulgence, alteration, ~~xchange, 
change in, or modification of any said indebtedness, liabilities and 
obligations, either expressed or implied or any contract or contracts 
evidencing any thereof, or any security or collateral therefor. II4 
The guarantor notified the creditor that he was no longer associated with the 
principal debtor and would not be_party to any new guaranties in connection 
with renewals and extensions of the original debt. After tilat n•:>ti.fication, the 
debtor and creditor agreed to subsequent renewals and extensions of the origi-
nal debt. In due course the debtor defaulted. 
After acknowledging the general rule " 'that guaranty agreements are to 
be strictly construed in favor of the guarantor' ... and 'the liability of a guar-
antor cannot be extended by construction,' " 115 the court concluded that the 
scope of the language in the guaranty could not be overcome. Judge Goldberg 
was unable "to conceive of a broader or more inclusive form of guaranty.'~ 116 
There was absolutely no limitation on the exposure of the guarantor for the 
court to construe.I 17 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma reached a similarly sensible result in 
the argument suggested here by reference to Sahel would probably not save the day for the 
creditor. 
111. See Note, supra note 12, at 85 (citing 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL 
PROPERTY 304 (1965); McNulty v. Codd, 157 Ga. App. 8, 276 S.E.2d 73 (1981), in which the court 
concluded without qualification that a guarantor is not entitled to notice of disposition of collat-
eral because the Code nowhere provides that such notice be afforded a guarantor (citing Brinson 
v. Co=ercial Bank, 138 Ga. App. 177, 225 S.E.2d 701 (1976)). 
112. See supra note 105 and authorities cited therein. 
113. 39 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 351 N.E.2d 254 (1976). 
114. Id. at 1054, 351 N.E.2d at 255. 
115. I d. See also King Kom Stamp Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 114 Ill. App. 2d 428, 
252 N.E.2d 734 (1969). 
116. Jacobson v. Devon Bank, 39 Ill App. 3d 1053, 1056, 351 N.E.2d 254, 256 (1976). 
117. See also Application of Bicke~ 14 Ill. App. 3d 813, 303 N.E.2d 541 (1973); Claude S. 
Corp. v. Henry's Drive-In, Inc., 51 Ill. App. 2d 289, 201 N.E.2d 127 (1964). 
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Riverside National Bank v. Manolakis, 118 but went a step further in its protec-
tion of creditors. The guaranty contract provided that the guarantor's "liabil-
ity would not be 'affected or impaired' by any 'failure, neglect or omission' of 
the bank to protect, in any manner, the collection of the indebtedness or the 
security given therefor." 119 The Oklahoma statute under consideration by the 
court in Manolakis provided that if a mortgagee failed to seek a deficiency 
judgment within ninety days after the foreclosure sale, the principal debtor's 
obligation would be absolutely terminated.120 The court had previously de-
cided in Apache Lanes, Inc. v. National Educators L!fe Insurance Co. 121 that 
the protection afforded by that statute extended to guarantors of the mortgage 
debt as well.122 At issue in Manolakis was whether the form of unconditional 
guaranty could effectively deprive the guarantor of the statutory protection 
afforded him ·by the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Apache Lanes. 
Justice Opala recognized that the creditor's decision to pursue or not to 
pursue a deficiency claim could affect the guarantor's subrogation right. 123 
But he refused to-go so far as.necessarily to discharge a guarantor whenever 
the statute discharged the principal debtor: 
[The discharge or nondischarge of the guarantor] must, of course, 
depend on the nature of the guarantor's undertaking. GivingApache 
the meaning for which the guarantor contends would make legally 
impermissible and hence unenforceable any guarantor's promise that 
is broad enough to survive § 686 discharge of the principal debtor. 
There is no statutory warrant for so restricting the creditor's power to 
exact a broader promise and the guarantor's capacity to bargain 
away his § 344124 defenses. In short, the protection of § 686 applies 
only to debtors. It does not make illegal those contracts that allow 
the guarantor's liability to survive§ 686 discharge nor can it,per se, 
operate to exonerate the guarantor from liability on an obligation 
deemed "satisfied" by that section.125 
118. 613 P.2d 438 (Okla. 1980). 
119. Id at 442. 
120. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 686 (1971) provides, in pertinent part: 
In actions to enforce a mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien or charge, a personal judg-
ment or judgment ... shall be rendered for the amount or amounts due .•.. Notwith-
standing the above provisions no judgment shall be enforced for any residue of the debt 
remaining unsatisfied as prescribed by this Act after the mortgaged property shall have 
been sold, except as herein provided. Simultaneously with the making of a motion for 
an order confirming the sale or in any event within ninety days after the date of the sale, 
the party to whom such residue shall be owing may make a motion in the action for 
leave to enter a deficiency judgment upon notice to the party against whom such judg-
ment is sought . . . . If no motion for a deficiency judgment shall be made • • • the 
proceeds of the sale regardless of amount shall be deemed to be in full satisfaction of the 
mortgage debt and no right to recover any deficiency in any action or proceeding shall 
exist. 
121. 529 P.2d 984 (Okla. 1974). 
122. Manolakis, 613 P.2d at 441. 
123. Id See also supra text accompanying notes 96-11 L 
124. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 344 (1971) provides that "[a] guarantor is not exonerated by the 
discharge of his principal by operation of law, without the intervention or omission of the 
creditor." 
125. 613 P.2d at 441 (footnote added). 
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That language maintains the essential distinction between the creditor-debtor 
and the creditor-guarantor relationships, and should encourage lenders not to 
forsake the contract of guaranty despite the fact that even the most complete 
forms have not always passed muster. Succinctly, if perhaps inelegantly, the 
result in Manolakis suggests that the baby should not be thrown out with the 
bath water. 126 
A recent decision of the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois, Commercial Discount Corp. v. King, 127 also required that 
the guarantor remain bound by the contract of guaranty he hacl signed. In a 
memorandum opinion, Judge Shadur considered the guarantor's interposition 
of seven separate defenses and had little difficulty finding each of them ineffec-
tive to preclude enforcement of the "continuing, absolute and unconditional 
guaranty." 128 Each of defendant guarantor's affirmative defenses ran directly 
counter to the clear language of the form of guaranty. 
In response to the guarantor's complaint that the creditor exceeded credit 
limits authorized under the Loan and Security Agreement, the court's opinion 
cited the express terms of the guaranty to the effect that such overadvances, 
even without notice to the guarantor, would "in no way affect or impair" the 
enforcement of the guaranty. 129 The guarantor also asserted that the guaranty 
had been terminated, and raised questions about the application of payments 
the creditor received after the alleged termination date. That defense was also 
summarily dismissed by reference to the terms of the guaranty. 130 Defenses 
premised on the creditor's alleged "control"131 of the debtor, the effect of the 
debtor's bankruptcy, 132 and the creditor's alleged failure to join other guaran-
tors and to deal properly with the collateral securing the principal debtor's 
obligation, merited, in the language of the opinion, "short shrift." 133 
Judge Shadur's opinion is particularly valuable to creditors because the 
guarantor in that case was not particularly sophisticated. He was an individ-
ual who argued that "as a nonprofessional guarantor he [was] entitled to strict 
construction of the documents in his favor." 134 The court refused to permit 
126. See also supra note 105. 
127. Commercial Discount Corp. v. King, No. 78-C-3442 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 1980), vacated in 
part, 515 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
128. Id, slip op. at 3 (quoting the express language of the guaranty). The court appended the 
very complete form of guaranty to its opinion. 
129. Id at 2 (quoting the express language of the guaranty). The contract of guaranty pro-
vided, in pertinent part: 
This guaranty shall be a continuing, absolute and unconditional guaranty, and shall re-
main in full force and effect until written notice of its discontinuance shall be actually 
received by CDC, and also until any and all of said indebtedness, obligations and liabili-
ties before receipt of such notice shall be fully paid. 
No. 78-C-3442, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 1980). 
130. Id 
131. Id The court again referred specifically to the language quoted supra note 129. See also 
Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resulting from Improper Jnterftrence with the Management 
of a Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus. LAW. 343 (1975). 
132. No. 78-C-3442, slip op. at 3-4. 
133. /d at 5. 
134. Id at 2. 
HeinOnline -- 61 N.C. L. Rev. 676 1982-1983
676 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
that reasoning to preclude the enforcement of the ''unequivocal and unambig-
uous terms"135 of the form contract of guaranty.136 
Two recent appellate decisions in North Carolina have upheld the strict 
language of the guaranty contracts notwithstanding the objection of the guar-
antors. In Love v. Bache & Co. 137 the North Carolina Court of Appeals recog-
nized that guaranties are governed by contract principles, and cited 
encyclopedic authority for the proposition that "[a] guarantor is bound by an 
agreement in the guaranty contract which permits extensions of time . . . . 
[A]n extension of time within the intent of the agreement does not discharge 
the guarantor."138 In Cities Service Oil Co. v. Howell Oil Co. 139 the court had 
previously noted that the law of the state is well-settled: "[t]he rights of the 
plaintiff as against the guarantors, defendants herein, arise out of the guaranty 
contract and must be based on that contract."140 Both Love and Cities Service 
are encouraging for creditors because the guarantors did not enjoy a strong 
negotiating posture vis-a-vis the creditor. Nevertheless, the appellate panels 
upheld the strict language of the guaranty contracts.141 
II. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT 
On October 1, 1979, the Bankruptcy Reform Act (Bankruptcy Code) 
came into effect replacing the prior Bankruptcy Act, which had been the effec-
tive federal insolvency law for over fifty years. 142 Like its predecessor, the 
13S. Id In a subsequent decision, Commercial Discount Corp. v. King, SIS F. Supp. 988 
(N.D. ill. 1981), portions of the memorandum opinion were vacated in light of events occurring 
after the creditor's motion for summary judgment was fully briefed. That tum of events, however, 
should not compromise the legal analysis of Judge Shadur's original memorandum opinion. The 
later developments dealt with issues of notice of sale of collateral due a guarantor. See supra text 
accompanying notes 96-111. For an example of a court's construing a contract of guaranty in the 
light most favorable to the creditor, see Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Fagan, 674 F.2d 302 (4th 
Cir. 1982). In Fagan the court of appeals held that a guarantor who assumed liability for "all 
debts and obligations of the Borrower'' was liable for reasonable attorney's fees of the creditor, 
because the note executed by the debtor included payment of reasonable attorney's fees as an 
obligation of the debtor. 
136. Judge Wisdom, in a 1981 decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, held that 
notwithstanding the guarantors' equitable defenses, the application of funds language in the guar-
anty contract was absolutely binding on the guarantors. ''The guarantors, therefore, have contrac· 
tually waived any equitable right they might otherwise have had to control the order of 
application." Bob Maxfield, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 637 F.2d 1033, 1041 (Sth Cir. 1981). 
See also Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Kellum, 641 F.2d 210 (Sth Cir. 1981) (guarantor's prior 
consent to modifications precluded guarantor from objecting to subsequent alteration of creditor· 
principal debtor agreement). 
137. 40 N.C. App. 617, 2S3 S.E.2d 3Sl (1981). 
138. Id at 619, 2S3 S.E.2d at 3S3 (citing 38 AM. JUR. 2o Guaranty § 94, at 1100 (1968)). 
139. 34 N.C. App. 29S, 237 S.E.2d 921 (1977). 
140. Id at 299, 237 S.E.2d at 924 (citing EAC Credit Corp. v. Wilson, 281 N.C. 140, 14S, 187 
S.E.2d 7S2, 7SS (1972)). 
141. See also North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Corbett, 271 N.C. 444, 1S6 S.E.2d 83S (1967) 
(creditor's failure to insert limitation of guarantor's liability in space provided did not preclude 
enforcement of unlimited guaranty). 
142. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 100-1326 (Supp. V 1981), represents 
the first major revision of federal insolvency law in the last fifty years. In Pub. L. No. 91-3S4, 84 
Stat. 468, effective July 24, 1970, Congress formed the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the 
United States. The Commission concluded its work on July 30, 1973, and Congressman Edwards 
introduced the draft statute on January 4, 1977. The Bankruptcy Reform Act became law on 
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Bankruptcy Code directly provides a federal fraudulent conveyance law and 
indirectly incorporates state fraudulent conveyance law through a "strong 
arm" provision.143 The applicable federal law is found in section 548: 
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor 
in property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made 
or incurred on or within one year before the date of the filing of the 
petition, if the debtor-
(!) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual in-
tent to hinder, delay or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or 
became, on or after the date that such transfer occurred or such obli-
gation was incurred, indebted; or 
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange 
for such transfer or obligation; and 
(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such 
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such 
transfer or obligation; 
(ii) was engaged in business, or was about to engage in business or 
a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was 
an unreasonably small capital; or 
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, 
debts that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts 
matured. 144 
A guaranty is clearly an "obligation incurred," and granting a security interest 
in personal property or a mortgage or deed of trust interest in real property to 
collateralize the guaranty would constitute a ''transfer" for purposes of section 
548. 
Professor Rosenberg, in an article construing the intended application of 
the prior fraudulent conveyance law to contracts of guaranty, 145 identified 
three types of guaranty contract: (1) the "downstream" guaranty; (2) the ''up-
stream" guaranty; and (3) the "cross-stream" guaranty. 146 When a parent cor-
poration guaranties the indebtedness of its subsidiary, the parent is a 
downstream guarantor. Such an arrangement normally poses no fraudulent 
November 6, 1978. The Commission sought to curb the increasing inadequacies of the prior law 
in four major areas: (1) the lack of useful reorganizational tools, which resulted in an increasing 
number of straight bankruptcies (liquidation); (2) the mounting administrative cost occasioned by 
delays in the system; (3) the lack of uniformity throughout the bankruptcy system; and (4) the lack 
of adequate protection of respective creditor and debtor interests. CoMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY 
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 595, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1973). 
143. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (Supp. V 1981) provides: 
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any obliga-
tion incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding 
an unsecured claim that is allowable under section 502 of this title or that is not allowa-
ble only under section 502(e) of this title. 
The chief significance of the incorporation of state law into the Bankruptcy Code is the extension 
of the federal one year statute of limitations period to as much as five years in some states. 
144. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (Supp. V 1981). Section 67(d) of the prior law governed fraudulent con-
veyances. 11 U.S.C. § 67(d) (1976). 
145. Rosenberg, Intercorporate Guaranties and the Law of Fraudulent Conveyances: Lender Be-
ware, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 235 (1976). 
146. Id at 238. 
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conveyance problems because the guarantor is receiving legally adequate con-
sideration. The parent is an "investor" in the subsidiary and the extension of 
loan proceeds to the subsidiary, which is facilitated by the guaranty, "protects 
the integrity and value of the principal's [parent's] investment."147 The credi-
tors of the parent, then, cannot complain, because by protecting the value of its 
asset (the subsidiary), the parent "helps to assure repayment of the principal's 
[parent's] direct creditors."148 Only upstream and cross-stream guaranties 
may give rise to fraudulent conveyance problems: in those contexts the credi-
tors of the guarantor have their positions compromised in favor of the credi-
tors of the principal debtor, an entity whose financial welfare could not inure 
to their benefit. 149 
Thanks to the eternal vigilance of bankruptcy trustees, there is little doubt 
that cases will arise to question the scope of the language of subsection 
548(a)(l), "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud." But of primary concern 
to lenders should be subsection 548(a)(2), which provides that taking a guar-
anty is a fraudulent conveyance if "less than a reasonably equivalent value" is 
given in exchange for the guaranty and the guarantor is rendered "insolvent" 
thereby. In an upstream guaranty situation, in which the subsidiary guaran-
tees the obligation of the holding company, it is difficult to see what value, if 
any, is received by the guarantor. It is not at all clear that the fiscal well-being 
of the parent directly benefits the subsidiary to the same extent that incurring 
the guaranty obligation diminishes the subsidiary. Hence, "reasonably 
equivalent value" may be lacking. 
The guarantor's failure to receive "reasonably equivalent value" for the 
guaranty obligation incurred does not alone subject the guaranty contract to 
avoidance by the debtor's representative in bankruptcy.tso It must also be 
147. Id 
148. Id 
149. The author describes the commercial role of "upstream" and "cross-stream" guaranties 
as follows: 
Typical circumstances in which a lender will require "upstream" guaranties are 
those in which its lending relationship is with a holding company and the bulk of the 
assets upon which the lender bases its credit judgment are distributed among the holding 
company's subsidiaries. In order to be in a position in which it reasonably can anticipate 
repayment out of the liquidation of those assets, the lender will require the subsidiaries 
to guaranty the obligation of the holding company and will frequently require that the 
guaranty of each subsidiary be secured by a security interest in its assets. . . . 
Id at 238 n.3. 
The "cross-stream" guaranty is indicated in the case in which two or more corporations 
are wholly owned by the same principals, particularly where they are involved m related 
activities and share a common destiny. Thus, for example, when one entity owns the 
land and plant from which the operations of another are conducted and both are owned 
by the same person or persons, a cautious lender will require that the nonborrowing 
afliliate guaranty the obligation with a security interest in, or lien on, the assets of the 
guarantor. 
Id at 238-39 n.4. 
ISO. In a Chapter XI proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor may remain in pos-
session during the reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102 {Supp. V 1981). Therefore, references to 
the bankruptcy trustee in Chapter XI proceedings are to be read as referring to either a trustee or a 
debtor in possession. 
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shown that the debtor at the time of the guaranty's execution151 was insolvent, 
or would be rendered insolvent as a result of the guaranty, or would be left 
with "an unreasonably small capital," or intended to incur debts that the 
debtor would be unable to pay at maturity. 152 The Bankruptcy Code defines 
"insolvency" in section 101(26) as "financial condition such that the sum of 
the entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property, at a fair 
valuation." 153 
Creditors' counsel will suggest that every guaranty obligation is necessar-
ily balanced by a concomitant asset: the subrogation right against the princi-
pal debtor. Also, when multiple parties guaranty an obligation, each of the 
guarantors has a right of contribution from the other guarantors. 154 Professor 
Rosenberg has suggested, however: 
Some conceptual problems are presented in this approach. The no-
tion that the guaranty of a solvent obligor is offset by a contingent 
asset based on the right of subrogation is simply not realistic; when 
and if the guarantor is called upon to perform, the value of that con-
tingent asset in all likelihood would be discounted severely because it 
probably would be no longer collectible. Otherwise, the guarantor 
would not have been called upon to perform.•ss 
The commentator offered no authority supporting that view, and, in fact, cited 
authority which holds to the contrary.156 A subsequent case has held that con-
tingent subrogation and contribution rights are valuable assets, at least so far 
as the fraudulent conveyance analysis is concerned. In In re Ol!ag Construc-
tion Equipment Cop. 157 the Second Circuit considered the situation of Ollag, 
a corporation with physical assets valued at about $140,000.158 The corpora-
tion's only significant liabilities were its contingent obligations as a guarantor 
of the debt of its parent corporation. The panel found that those liabilities 
"were tied to certain intangible assets . . . . Ollag had a right of subrogation 
to recover against [the principal debtor] on the [creditor's] claims. Moreover, 
Ollag could demand contribution from the co-guarantors."159 The court made 
no reference to Professor Rosenberg's commentary, but clearly rejected his 
151. See II U.S.C. § 67d(5). See also Rosenberg, supra note 145, at 252. 
152. See UCC § 1-201(23) (1978), which defines an "insolvent" as an entity that "either has 
ceased to pay (its] debts in the ordinary course of business or cannot pay [its] debts as they become 
due or is insolvent within the meaning of the federal bankruptcy law." 
153. II U.S.C. § 101(26) (Supp. V 1981). 
154. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60. 
!55. Rosenberg, supra note 145, at 256 (emphasis added). 
156. See In re Bowers, 215 F. 617, 618 (N.D. Ga. 1914), in which the court reasoned that: 
the liability of a person as a surety or indorser, if the principal is solvent and abundantly 
able to pay, is not such a liability as could be counted against him on the question of his 
solvency or insolvency, because, if called on to pay such debt, he would immediately 
have an asset which would be equal to the amount he would be required to pay. 
See also Wingert v. Hagerstown Bank, 41 F.2d 660 (4th Cir.), cerl. denied, 282 U.S. 871 (1930). 
157. 578 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1978). 
158. ld at 908 n.l2. 
159. /d at 908. The court found the bankruptcy judge's holding that the subrogation and 
contribution rights were "worth little" to be clearly erroneous. Id 
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analysis.160 
It may very well be that the right of subrogation or contribution would be 
of insignificant value in the case of some guaranties. When the language of 
Professor Rosenberg's conclusion is considered, 161 it seems that his analysis 
has some validity when applied to guaranties of collection, 162 in which the 
guarantor is called upon to perform only after the creditor's collection efforts 
have proved unavailing.163 In the case of guaranties of payment, however, the 
form of guaranty typically required by creditors, the commentator's analysis 
breaks down and is clearly contrary to case law. Nevertheless, prudent credi-
tors should not rely on a bankruptcy court's following the analysis suggested 
in 01/ag .164 In a multicorporation setting, a creditor will always insist upon 
the related corporation's providing "consolidating,"165 rather than merely 
"consolidated,"166 financial statements. Creditors with significant leverage 
may be able to require their debtors to adjust their corporate structure, for 
example through merger, to avoid taking what may ultimately be character-
ized as an ''upstream" guaranty. 
The shortcomings of Professor Rosenberg's analysis and the soundness of 
the Second Circuit's opinion in 01/ag have been recognized by a creditor's 
attorney, William Coquillette.167 Coquillette considered the fate of upstream 
guaranties under state law, particularly in those states that have adopted the 
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act (UFCA). In the course of some very 
cogent treatment of the value of subrogation and contribution rights in the 
context of the contingent liability represented by a guaranty, Coquillette sug-
gested that there is no significant distinction between the treatment of up-
160. See also Schwartzv. Comm'r, 560 F.2d311 (8th Cir. 1977); Syracuse Eng'g Co. v. HaiJ;~tt, 
97 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1938); Updike v. Oakland Motor Car Co., 53 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1931); Wmg-
ert v. Hagerstown Bank, 41 F.2d 660 (4th Cir.), cerl. denied, 282 U.S. 871 (1930); First Nat'l Bank 
v. Jefferson Sales & Distrib., Inc., 341 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Miss. 1971), affd per curiam, 460 F.2d 
1059 (5th Cir. 1972). 
161. See language emphasized supra text accompanying note 155. 
162. See supra text accompanying notes 16-22. 
163. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22. 
164. A recent bankruptcy court decision, however, has cited the 01/ag decision with approval 
and valued subrogation and contribution rights as counterbalances to the contingent liability rep-
resented by a guaranty contract. See In re Hemphill, 18 Bankr. 38 (S.D. Iowa 1982). 
165. "Consolidating" financial statements reveal the separate and distinct financial profile of 
each of the related corporate entities. 
166. "Consolidated" financial statements are: 
balance sheets, income statements, and statements of changes in financial position of a 
parent company and its subsidiaries, lumped together as though they were a single com· 
pany with one or more divisions or branches. The grouping of all financial matters ig-
nores legal entities. The purpose is to make the communication of financial results to 
shareholders and creditors meaningful by eliminating intercompany receivables, pay-
abies, investments, income, losses, and expenses. The parent company must have a con-
trolling interest-defined as a majority voting interest either directly or indirectly-in the 
·subsidiary in order for consolidation to be required. 
I. KELLOGG, How TO USE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS§§ 1.38-1.41 {2d ed. 1979). Kellogg warns 
that any analysis of parent-subsidiary financial statements must take into account the "potential 
for manipulation between the two entities." Id 
167. Coquillette, supra note 13. Coquillette is associated with the firm of Jones, Day, Reavis 
& Pogue, in its Cleveland office. 
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stream guaranties under the UFCA and their treatment under the Bankruptcy 
Code. He asserted the equivalence of the two statutes with regard to their 
definition of "insolvency" in order to extend the reasoning of the 01/ag deci-
sion, a bankruptcy case, to state fraudulent conveyance actions under the 
UFCA: 
Instead of referring to "present fair salable value" of assets, the 
Bankruptcy Act referred to a "fair valuation of the aggregate of [its] 
property." This difference should not preclude application of the 01-
/ag holding in the context of the UFCA. Although the concept of 
salability was not expressed in the Bankruptcy Act definition, it was 
necessarily implied in the concept of "a fair valuation."l68 
The commentator is correct, but he does not go far enough. By failing to 
distinguish between "present fair salable value" (UFCA) and "fair valuation" 
(Bankruptcy Code), Coquillette overlooked what may constitute a strong ar-
gument for the creditor resisting a trustee's fraudulent conveyance attack. The 
phrase "present fair salable value" has been construed as a liquidation value 
standard: 
Before an asset is counted, it must have a market value, measured by 
a willing seller and a willing buyer, and it must be subject to liquida-
tion within a reasonably immediate period of time. Thus, if an asset 
can be converted to cash only in the future, it will not be included on 
the asset side.169 
Commenting upon that liquidation value appraisal, Coquillette acknowledged 
that "[a]ssets which are very valuable to the corporation in its business but 
which are hard to sell present a problem, and some courts would have such 
assets excluded from the calculation."l70 It appears, then, that to equate the 
"fair valuation" standard of bankruptcy law with the UFCA insolvency stan-
dard suggests that "fair valuation" means mere liquidation value. 
A creditor asserting that his guarantor was solvent at the time the guar-
anty was executed may very well argue that the guarantor's assets should be 
valued as of that date on a basis similar to a "going-concern" value rather than 
on a liquidation value basis. There is authority to support just such an argu-
ment. In discussing "value" in the context of a Chapter XJ171 proceeding 
under the Bankruptcy Act, Judge Cyr determined in In re American Kitchen 
168. /d. at 457. 
169. Rosenberg, supra note 145, at 254-55. But see Duncan v. Landis, 106 F. 839, 859 (3d Cir. 
1901) ("A man's property, at a fair valuation, may amount to sufficient to pay his debts although 
he might not be able to realize at once the amount of that valuation."); Tumarkin v. Gallay, 127 F. 
Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (balance sheet standard). 
170. Coquillette, supra note 13, at 455. See also G1enmore Distilleries Co. v. Seideman, 267 F. 
Supp. 915 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). 
171. Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act provided for business reorganizations. The following 
discussion of value is particularly apposite to fraudulent conveyance analysis because the assets of 
a business not yet in bankruptcy (at the time of the conveyance) should certainly be as entitled to 
the "going-concern" valuation suggested as those of a business already in a Chapter XI 
proceeding. 
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Foods, Inc. 172 that the value obtainable through a "commercially reasonably 
disposition" of the assets was the appropriate construction of the Act's concept 
of "value."173 It has been suggested that "Judge Cyr's consistent use of a stan-
dard shaped by the commercial realities at each stage of the proceeding and 
the use of a standard approaching full going-concern value . . . may well in-
fluence decisions of courts operating under the Code." 174 Creditors defending 
an upstream or cross-stream guaranty in a Chapter 11 proceeding175 should 
assert Judge Cyr's valuation analysis in order to establish the solvency of the 
guarantor at the time the guaranty was executed. A recent bankruptcy court 
decision176 has acknowledged that "[u]nless a business is on its deathbed ... 
the 'fair value' of its assets, within the meaning and purview of 547(b) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 177 is the going concern value or fair market price."l78 
Finally, when considering the potential fraudulent conveyance ramifica-
tions of guaranties taken from an "insolvent" guarantor, the commentators 
have apparently ignored section 548(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. That section 
provides that if the trustee does set aside a transaction (such as a grant of a 
security interest to collateralize a guaranty) as fraudulent, the creditor may 
retain a lien against the property transferred to the extent of any value given 
by the creditor "in good faith." 179 In order to attempt to establish that "good 
faith," a creditor may require an "Affidavit of Solvency" lao from one or more 
172. 2 BANKR. CT. DEc. (CRR) 715 (N.D. Me. 1976). See also In re Pembroke Manor Apts., 
547 F.2d 805 (4th Cir. 1977); In re Blazon Flexible Flyer, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 861 (N.D. Ohio 1976). 
173. 2 BANKR. CT. DEc. at 720-21. Section 548(d)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code defines 
''value" as "property, or satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor, but 
does not include an unperformed promise to furnish support to the debtor or to a relative of the 
debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1981). That definition, however, is inapposite for the 
purposes of determining a valuation standard. 
174. ILLINOIS INST. OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE UNDER THE 
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978, at 11-8 (1980). Judge Cyr was speaking to the issue of 
adequate protection (now codified at II U.S.C. § 362(d) (Supp. V 1981)) but his analysis is also 
useful beyond that discrete subject area. 
175. Chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code is titled "Reorganization." It would seem that Judge 
Cyr's analysis could also be applied to Chapter 7 "Liquidation" proceedings, because the nature 
of the debtor at the time of the allegedly fraudulent conveyance is the same whether relief is 
ultimately sought under Chapter 7 or II. 
176. In re Utility Stationery Stores, Inc., 12 Bankr. 170 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
177. 12 Bankr. at 176 (Section 547 is concerned with "Preferences"). 
178. I d. (citing Langham, Langstrom & Burnett v. Blachard, 246 F.2d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 1957); 
In re Fred D. Jones Co., 268 F. 818, 819 (7th Cir. 1920); In re Windsor Indus. Inc., 459 F. Supp. 
270, 276 (N.D. Tex. 1978). 
179. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (Supp. V 1981) provides: 
Except to the extent that a transfer or obligation voidable under this section is void-
able under section 544, 545, or 547 of this title, a transferee or obligee of such a transfer 
or obligation that takes for value and in good faith has a lien on any interest transferred, 
may retain any lien transferred, or may enforce any obligation incurred, as the case may 
be to the extent that such transferee or obligee gave value to the debtor in exchange for 
such transfer or obligation. 
The last clause of that section may cause creditors some difficulty because the party attacking the 
conveyance as fraudulent will argue that the creditor in fact gave no value to the debtor. "Value" 
in subsection (c), however, may be read as distinct from the "reasonably equivalent value" in 
subsection (a)(2)(A). That standard could be easier for the creditor to satisfy. 
180. These affidavits are sometimes referred to as "Guaranties of Validity." 
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of the principals of the guarantor corporation.18 1 While by no means fail-safe, 
the document requires the principal's attestation to the solvency of the corpo-
rate guarantor. The self-serving purpose of the form is transparent, but that 
should not necessarily .compromise its effectiveness. 
The affidavit has value beyond the fraudulent conveyance context. It typ-
ically provides that the affiant will assist the creditor in liquidating the collat-
eral at a specified rate of salary182 for a specified period of time.183 The 
creditor is not, of course, obligated to retain the affiant in its .;:mploy but is 
given the option of doing so. In any event, such an option is not worthwhile 
(in other words, not "cost-effective") if the creditor must initiate litigation to 
enforce it. Many responsible affiants will, however, feel a moral obligation to 
fulfill the terms of the affidavit. 184 Nevertheless, it would be neither overly 
zealous nor entirely inappropriate to take a personal guaranty as well as an 
Affidavit of Solvency from the principal, if the structure of the transaction 
allows. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Many of the cases applying common law and statutory provisions have 
displayed a substantial bias in favor of the interests of those who contract to 
answer for the debt of another. The (perhaps unfortunate) creditor who has 
relied, presumably in good faith, on the enforceability of the guaranty obliga-
tion has often been the victim of arguably ill-reasoned proguarantor decisions. 
While many of the defenses to guaranty liability are founded on cogent and 
equitable legal reasoning, the courts' inconsistencies have hampered the integ-
rity of credit documentation. Nevertheless, reports of the demise of the guar-
anty contract are exaggerated. Through careful and complete documentation 
combined with scrupulous attention to the rights of the guarantor, creditors 
may place significant stock in the efficacy of the guaranty. The persuasive 
legal arguments presented in this article are available to lenders' counsel. By 
implementing these suggestions, creditors' attorneys may even be able to steer 
a careful course between the Scylla and Charybdis of fraudulent conveyance 
and UCC protections that guarantors are wont to assert ~ order to avoid 
liability. 
181. The affidavits may or may not be taken in lieu of a personal guaranty from the debtor's 
principal. Corporate principals often refuse to sign a guaranty when a creditor drafts it to provide 
a collateral interest in the principal's primary residence. 
182. This rate of salary is usually based on the rate paid to the principal in the three months 
prior to the principal debtor's default under the loan agreement. 
183. The period is normally no longer than required to effect a commercially reasonable dis-
position of the principal debtor's assets. 
184. This is particularly true in the case of many of the entrepreneurs who enter into financing 
arrangements With commercial finance companies. Such people take the responsibilities of their 
corporation as their own, notwithstanding the corporate legal fiction. 
